Selling Through Referrals by Condorelli, Daniele et al.
Selling Through Referrals
∗
Daniele Condorelli†, Andrea Galeotti‡and Vasiliki Skreta§
April 14, 2018
Abstract
We endogenize intermediaries’ choice to operate as agents or merchants in a market where
there are frictions due to asymmetric information about consumption values. A seller has an
object for sale and can reach buyers only through intermediaries. Intermediaries can either
mediate the transaction by buying and reselling–the merchant mode–or refer buyers to the
seller for a fee–the referral mode. When the seller has a strong bargaining position and can
condition the asking price to the intermediaries’ business model choice, all intermediaries
specialize in agency. The seller’s and intermediaries’ joint profits equal the seller’s profits
when he has access to all buyers. When the seller does not have such bargaining power, the
level of the referral fee and the degree of competition among intermediaries determine the
business mode adoption. A hybrid agency-merchant mode may be adopted in equilibrium.
Banning the referral mode can decrease welfare since the merchant mode is associated with
additional allocative distortions due to asymmetric information.
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1 Introduction
An intermediary is an economic agent that facilitates the connection between supply and
demand. Intermediaries purchase from suppliers and resell to customers or facilitate the meeting
of buyers and sellers. For example, online travel agents such as Expedia, Priceline, and Orbitz
connect buyers to hoteliers, airlines and car rental companies. Amazon marketplace, Groupon,
and alike, connect buyers to retailers selling a variety of goods. Amazon and Apple intermediate
the E-books industry. Intermediation is also important in off-line markets and beyond traditional
retailing. For instance, it plays a key role in trading real estate, art, used cars, books, as well as
in markets for professional services.1
Intermediaries predominantly operate under two business models — or hybrids of those.
Under the referral mode (or agency mode), they refer buyers to sellers, who then negotiate
directly on the terms of trade. In return, intermediaries receive referral fees for the creation of
the match and/or commissions based on sales. Under the more traditional retailer/merchant
mode, intermediaries buy goods from suppliers for resale to consumers.
In the online travel industry, Priceline makes most of its revenue through the referral
mode and the rest from acting as a merchant. Priceline’s subsidiary Booking.com is an agency-
based business, while its subsidiary Agoda is a merchant-based business.2 Expedia operates
mainly under the merchant mode receiving roughly 75 percent of its revenue through the mer-
chant mode and some 21 percent through the referral mode.3 Expedia expanded its business by
acquiring the agency-based online hotel business Venere. Orbitz’s net revenue stems fairly evenly
from its air and hotel businesses (34 and 29 percent respectively), with its revenue from the hotel
business coming mainly from the merchant mode.4
In this paper, we explicitly model the choice of an intermediary to operate as a merchant
or a reseller.5 Beyond providing insights on the equilibrium structure of the industry, we also
analyze the effects of the two models on market outcomes and welfare. Finally, we draw some
implications for competition policy. Crucially, we consider markets where both options, to refer
or to resell, are available to intermediaries and not controlled by sellers.
An intermediary who chooses its business model faces the following trade-off, which is
at the core of our analysis. By operating as an agent, the intermediary’s revenue only depends on
1Intermediation is pervasive: according to Spulber (1996)’s calculations, it represented about 25% of US GDP
in 1995. This is arguably a conservative estimate of the size of intermediation today. Since 1995, the diffusion of
the Internet has boosted the creation of hundreds of new on-line marketplaces, where intermediaries manage the
interaction between buyers and sellers (e.g., Amazon, Airbnb, Alibaba, Uber).
2For more details, see Business Insider (2012) and priceline.com, Inc. (2011)
3Expedia, Inc. (2013, p.10)
4Orbitz Worldwide Inc. (2012, p.35). Orbitz also owns online travel agents such as CheapTickets and ebookers.
5We take the existence of intermediaries as given. The literature has provided various rationales for the
existence of middlemen. The main idea in the economics of intermediation is that the matching between sellers
and buyers is not frictionless; intermediaries, then, emerge because they own technologies that allow to ameliorate
these frictions with some comparative advantage (e.g., see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987)).
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the number of consumers he refers to the seller and on the referral fee. There is no uncertainty,
nor a dependence on the market structure. Instead, by becoming a merchant, the intermediary
makes a risky profit that depends on the difference between the expected cost and revenue of
buying and reselling. These variables, in turn, depend on the market structure, not just on the
number of buyers, and on the protocols that regulate trade upstream and downstream.
We develop a simple model that captures some of the forces shaping intermediaries’
decisions to operate as merchants or agents, and allows us to perform comparative statics. In our
baseline model, there is a seller with one object for sale. The seller is in contact with a number
of intermediaries, each intermediary has access to a subset of buyers, and each buyer has private
information about his valuation. The seller and the intermediaries have no consumption value
for the object. The interaction between the seller, the intermediaries and the buyers is captured
by a three-phase game. In the business-model choice phase, each intermediary decides whether
to become an agent or a merchant. An agent-intermediary refers all her buyers to the seller
in exchange for a referral payment. In the trading phase, the choices of intermediaries become
public, the seller sells to referred buyers and merchant-intermediaries. If a referred buyer obtains
the object, the game ends. If a merchant-intermediary obtains the object, then we enter the
resale phase: the merchant-intermediary resells to the buyers he is in contact with.
Our model captures salient features of several industries. One notable example is the
market for hotel rooms. First, hotel rooms are limited in number, and supply cannot be increased
in the short term. Second, hotel rooms are extremely differentiated (by city area, comfort level,
etc.) and therefore their sellers may enjoy non-negligible market power. Third, multiple inter-
mediaries operate in the market and both intermediaries and sellers can potentially conduct the
sale. As we have mentioned earlier, both merchant intermediaries, such as Expedia, and agents,
such as Booking, operate in the market. Finally, as in our model, it is costly for consumers to
look for hotels without shopping via an intermediary, and likewise hotels have no mean to directly
advertise to potential buyers in a cost-effective way.6
Our first result (Theorem 1) shows that when the seller has full bargaining power and can
choose the selling procedure, regardless of the level of referral payments, in the unique equilibrium
of the game intermediaries adopt the referral model. The prevalence of the referral mode is a
consequence of the seller’s ability to tailor the minimum price to the intermediary’s business
model choice. Indeed, the seller anticipating the resale value of a merchant-intermediary never
sets the minimum reserve price below that value. Thus merchants enjoy no rent from buying and
6In our model, consumers cannot approach the seller directly. Nonetheless, in some cases, such as for the case
of hotel rooms, the identity of the seller must be revealed prior to the sale. Our assumption still makes sense when
the intermediary is a merchant, as in that case the seller has no longer the good for sale. However, in practice, it
is conceivable that a consumer may attempt to bypass the agent intermediary and contact the seller directly, in an
attempt to attain a rebate equivalent to the referral fee. It appears that this concern is either not substantial (e.g.,
in the case of AirBnb where the details of the seller are not revealed before the booking) or otherwise handled by
mean or resale-price maintenance clauses.
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reselling. As a consequence, adopting the referral mode is strictly preferable.
Since referrals operate frictionlessly, the industry’s specialization in agency implies that
the aggregate equilibrium profit of both the seller and the intermediaries equals the expected
seller’s profit when he has direct access to all buyers–what we call the “integrated-industry profit.”
Hence, in equilibrium mis-allocation distortions arising from intermediation via resale are elimi-
nated. In particular, there is no risk that the “wrong” intermediary acquires the object and resells
it to a low-value buyer, thereby excluding out of the market high-value buyers who are clients of
different intermediaries.
When all intermediaries adopt the referral mode, not only industry profit but welfare,
including consumer surplus, is unambiguously higher than in the case in which some intermedi-
aries adopt the merchant mode. This follows from the observation in the previous paragraph and
from the fact that both the seller and a merchant-intermediary choose the same reserve price.7
This finding contributes to the industrial-organization literature on vertical restraints
and provides additional insights into a policy-relevant issue.8 More precisely, we provide a market-
based rationale for the adoption of an referral mode and show that, ultimately, consumers may
benefit from such a vertical agreement. Since higher prices in our setup reflect a more efficient
allocation, buyers may benefit even in cases in which the final price ends up being higher than
under the merchant mode. This observation could be relevant for competition policy in view
of the increasing number of intermediaries that operate as agents, and the new challenges that
intermediated markets pose for competition authorities.
As a concrete example, consider the United States v. Apple Inc. case. In 2012 the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against Apple and a number of major publishers for
an alleged conspiracy, having the objective to raise e-book prices (see Gaudin and White (2014)).
At the core of the case is a shift of the e-book industry toward the referral mode. Whereas before
Apple’s entry into the market the price of e-books was set by resellers (such as Amazon), after
Apple’s entry into the market the industry converged to a new standard, characterized by the
referral mode. The DOJ claimed that a shift to an referral mode, prompted by Apple, played
an instrumental role in a collusive agreement between publishers and Apple with the aim of
raising e-book prices.9 While not providing an explicit counterargument to the court’s finding,
our analysis suggests a channel through which consumers may have benefited from the adoption
of the referral mode, despite the alleged increase in e-book prices.10
7The inefficiencies that are eliminated by the referral mode cannot be easily suppressed through a more
traditional simple vertical agreement, such as a royalty contract, unless there is exactly one intermediary. We
elaborate on this later.
8See Rey (2003) for an extensive survey of the academic literature on vertical restraints and an account of the
legal issues related to vertical restraints in the United States and the European Union.
9The DOJ won the case against Apple and reached a settlement which forced Apple to operate as a merchant.
Apple is appealing.
10In particular, the court was also concerned that the referral mode could favor horizontal collusion among
publishers, a point which was at the core of the DOJ’s case. Moreover, the source of inefficiency emphasized in
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The result that the referral mode emerges as the unique equilibrium outcome is not
limited to the case in which the seller has full bargaining power but generalizes widely to other
trading environments where the seller is able to condition his pricing strategy on the intermedi-
aries’ decisions. In Appendix B, we show that Theorem 1 holds under much weaker assumptions:
The seller can employ other selling protocols, intermediaries can have access to different numbers
of buyers who belong to different subgroups, and can have private information both about which
buyers they know as well as about these buyers’ valuations.
In some cases, however, the seller cannot fully condition his pricing strategy to the
business choices of the intermediaries. This might be the case, for instance, because of competi-
tion among sellers in the upstream market that drives price down to cost and limits the pricing
flexibility of sellers. Or, it may be too costly for the seller to observe and react to the choice of
intermediaries to refer or not. To address this case, in the second part of the paper we assume
the seller auctions the object either without a minimum reserve price or at a reserve price that
is fixed and does not depend on whether or not intermediaries are among the buyers.
The predictions change substantially. When the referral fees are sufficiently high, in-
termediaries still adopt the referral mode. However, when referral fees are low, intermediaries
adopt a hybrid business model, that involves both agency and merchant activities. In particular,
in the only symmetric equilibrium, intermediaries randomize between the two business models
(Theorem 2).11 As expected, in this symmetric equilibrium, the merchant mode arises with
higher probability the smaller the referral fee. In contrast, when the number of intermediaries
increases, the profit obtained by merchant-intermediaries decreases as they face more competi-
tion, and therefore the referral mode becomes more prominent in equilibrium. In fact, for any
finite agency fee, agency becomes the dominant business model as the number of intermediaries
in the market grows large.
This extension shows that when the seller has less bargaining power, then the level of
downstream competition and the level of referral fee are both key determinants of the interme-
diaries’ business model. In equilibrium intermediaries earn both referral fees and profits from
buying and reselling. We also observe that if the market is sufficient large, and the seller can
choose the level of referral fee, then the seller has an incentive to induce each intermediary to
operate as a merchant.
Combining the two parts of our paper, we provide a theory that determines the con-
ditions under which intermediaries sell through referrals, operate as merchants, or employ both
business models. Our theory points out that the bargaining power of the seller in defining the
trading protocol, the level of referral fee, and the level of competition across intermediaries are
our paper arises out of rationing, which is arguably not a major problem in the case of e-books.
11Pure strategy equilibria exists and are asymmetric: one intermediary becomes a merchant and all the others
adopt the referral mode.
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three key determinant of the business model that intermediaries adopt.
The existing literature on intermediation has predominately studied why intermediaries
exist. The basic premise is that there are frictions that may prevent buyers and sellers from
transacting, and that intermediaries are endowed with a technology that reduces these frictions.
A large number of papers have focused on search frictions (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987; Yavas,
1992, 1994, 1996; Gehrig, 1993; Watanabe, 2010, 2013; Johri and Leach, 2002; Shevchenko, 2004;
Smith, 2004; Shi and Siow, 2012). The literature has then moved to understand the implications
of intermediation for markets, by taking as exogenous the intermediaries’ business model.
Other strands of the literature have studied the two business models in isolation. For ex-
ample, the literature on resale, (Calzolari and Pavan, 2006; Zheng, 2002; Jehiel and Moldovanu,
1999, e.g.), and the literature on intermediation in networks, (Blume et al., 2007; Condorelli and Galeotti,
2012; Nava, 2015), assumes that intermediaries act as merchants and focuses on understanding
how the possibility of resale affects the seller’s incentives and the efficiency of market outcomes.
In contrast, the existing literature on referrals, e.g., Arbatskaya and Konishi (2012), Park (2005)
and Garicano and Santos (2004) assumes that intermediaries act as agents and study how refer-
rals improve matching between buyers and sellers.12
The referral and the merchant mode of intermediation are jointly analyzed in Johnson
(2013a) and Johnson (2013b). These papers compare the referral mode (one in which the pricing
for final customers is directly set by the wholesaler) to the merchant mode (where the retailer
sets the price for final consumers). The focus is on the competition among a set of spatially
differentiated products. Further, Hagiu (2007) provides a comparison of the two models based
on complementarity among the products of different sellers. In contrast to our work, in these
papers information is complete and the choice between the agency and the merchant mode is not
endogenous.
A handful of recent theoretical papers endogenize the choice to operate as a merchant
or an agent. A closely related paper is Hagiu and Wright (2014) in which the intermediary
decides between operating as an agent (i.e., marketplace) or as a reseller (i.e., a merchant).
Their paper focuses on a different trade-off than the one we have highlighted. The optimal
choice of the intermediary depends on the relative quality of information that the intermediary
and the suppliers have about sale-enhancing marketing activities. A related trade-off is analyzed
in Hagiu and Wright (2015). Abhishek et al. (2015) focus on the effect on this choice of price
and demand spillovers from the electronic channel to the traditional channel. Other papers
that endogenize this choice include Lu (2015) and Gautier et al. (2016) who focus on different
trade-offs faced by intermediaries. See Vettas (2017) for a recent comprehensive survey.
12Montgomery (1991) and Galenianos (2012) study the effects of allowing firms to hire through referrals for
labor-market outcomes. In these two papers, hiring through a referral means hiring a social contact of a current
employee. We are interested in the role of referrals in markets where trade can be intermediated and so our model
of referral and the questions we pose are different from these works.
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Section 2 describes the basic model and Section 3 provides the equilibrium analysis.
Section 4 characterizes equilibrium when the seller cannot set a minimum reserve price. Section
5 explores the various directions to which our results are robust and, finally, Section 6 concludes.
Appendix A contains the proofs. Appendix B generalizes our results of Section 3, while Appendix
C endogenizes referral fees both in the case where the seller has the power to set them, as well
as in the case where intermediaries do.
2 Model
The seller of an indivisible object is connected to n ≥ 1 intermediaries, I = {1, 2, ..., n},
and each intermediary has access to a set of buyers Bi. For simplicity we assume that intermedi-
aries have exclusive access to their buyers, Bi ∩ Bj = ∅, for all i, j ∈ I and i 6= j; we also assume
that all intermediaries are connected to the same number of buyers, |Bi| = B for all i ∈ I.13
The seller and the intermediaries derive zero utility from consuming the object. Each
buyer j has a private consumption value for the object, vj ∈ [0, 1], distributed according to the
CDF F , with density f . We assume that all values are independently drawn and are buyers’
private information. All players are risk neutral. The seller and intermediaries maximize profit
while buyers maximize their surplus.
We consider the following game, which unfolds in three stages:
First Stage: Business Model Phase. Given an exogenous referral fee, κ ≥ 0, intermediaries
choose their business model simultaneously: Each intermediary i ∈ I decides whether to operate
as a merchant, taking actionM , or as an agent, taking action A. If intermediary i ∈ I decides to
operate as an agent, she refers her buyers to the seller in exchange for referral payments κB, and
exits the game. Intermediaries who adopt the merchant mode participate to the second stage.
Second Stage: Trading Phase. At the beginning of the second stage, the business model
of all intermediaries becomes public. The seller sets a non-negative reserve price, and runs a
second-price auction with the chosen reserve price.14 Bidders in this auction are the merchant-
intermediaries and the buyers referred to the seller in the first stage. All bidders simultaneously
submit a bid. If there are bids above (or equal to) the reserve price, the good is awarded to the
highest bidder, who pays the maximum between the second highest bid and the reserve price.
The game ends if no trade takes place or if a buyer gets the good. When a merchant-intermediary
acquires the object the game proceeds to the re-sale stage.
13These assumptions are relaxed in Appendix B.
14The second price auction is a natural choice in this environment. It is an optimal auction when the reserve
price is appropriately chosen. With no reserve price, a second price auction essentially generates the minimum
price compatible with an efficient allocation. As we illustrate in Appendix B, the fact that trading takes place
through a second price auction is not crucial for our qualitative results.
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Third Stage: Re-sale Phase. After acquiring the object, a merchant-intermediary sets a
non-negative reserve price and runs a second price auction.15 Only his buyers, i.e. those in Bi
can participate in the auction; it is irrelevant what players observe of the past history. The game
ends at the end of the resale phase, regardless of whether or not trade took place.
We characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria in which players play un-dominated strate-
gies on and off-path. The latter requirement implies that all participants in a second price auction
always bid their own valuation. In particular, final consumers bid their private valuation, and
merchant-intermediaries bid their resale value, which is the payoff they expect to obtain in the
resale phase if they acquire the good in the second-stage.
The model above abstracts from ancillary costs that may arise from setting up a referral
program or, more generally, organizing the sale and aims at streamlining the basic trade-off that
an intermediary faces when deciding whether to operate as a merchant or as an agent. In
particular, by operating as an agent, the intermediary obtains a fixed and deterministic payment
from the seller, which only depends on the referral fee and the number of buyers that are connected
to the intermediary. Instead, by operating as merchant the intermediary aims at buying the
object from the seller at a low price and at reselling it to his buyers at a higher price. The buying
and selling price, however, depend on a number of variables, and, in particular, on the market
structure and the trading protocol—which therefore crucially affect the choice of the intermediary
in equilibrium.16
Importantly, the way this basic trade-off resolves in equilibrium is not contingent on
the many specific assumptions of this framework and we clarify this when we present the results
and elaborate on them in Appendix B. We do remark here that all the results we obtain extend,
qualitatively, to the case where the referral payment to an intermediary is a percentage of the
seller’s profit (a “commission”), rather than a fixed fee per-buyer fee.
3 Pricing flexibility and the rise of the referral mode
Our first result shows that, as long as referral fees are positive, i.e., κ > 0, in equilibrium
all intermediaries adopt the referral mode.
Theorem 1. In the game where trading occurs via second price auction with reserve price, for
all κ > 0, there is a unique equilibrium outcome where all intermediaries adopt the referral mode.
To understand the result, suppose there is an equilibrium where some intermediary i
15As noted before, this is an optimal mechanism from the reseller’s perspective.
16A merchant also exposes himself to an inventory risk, i.e., the risk of buying and not being able to resell.
In our model, we assume that intermediaries are risk-neutral. Therefore, we shut down the payoff penalty that
bearing this risk entails when the intermediary operates as a merchant. Clearly, risk-averse intermediaries would
have higher incentives to choose the referral mode.
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chooses to operate as a merchant with positive probability. Then, consider that the seller chooses
a reserve price knowing that i is a merchant. According to the equilibrium logic, the seller also
knows the expected payoff that merchant-intermediary i obtains, should he acquire the object
and resell it to buyers Bi, i’s resale value denoted by Vi. The key observation is that the expected
demand of the seller is inelastic for prices below Vi and since there is only one good for sale, the
seller never sets a reserve price lower than Vi. But this implies that merchant-intermediary i
makes an expected payoff of zero in the seller’s auction. Hence, the intermediary strictly gains
by adopting the referral mode in the first stage.
Appendix B investigates the robustness of Theorem 1. We show that the result extends
to asymmetric buyers, to asymmetric intermediaries, e.g., |Bi| 6= |Bj|, to the possibility that each
intermediary can choose to refer any subset of their buyers,17 to the case where intermediaries
have information about the number of bidders and their values of bidders that is not available
to sellers, and to different trading mechanisms.18 Heuristically, what matters for the result of
Theorem 1 is the ability of the seller to rank merchant intermediaries based on their resale values,
and to have trading mechanisms that allow the seller to extract the resale value of some of these
intermediaries.
We now consider equilibrium payoffs. We call integrated-industry profit, and denote it
by Π∗, the revenue that the seller achieves, ex-ante, if she has direct access to all buyers. The
next result follows directly from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. In the game where trading occurs via second price auction with reserve price, in
the unique equilibrium outcome when κ > 0, the sum of the ex-ante expected payoff of the seller
and of the intermediaries is equal the integrated-industry profit Π∗. The expected payoff of the
seller is Π∗ − nBκ, whereas each intermediary obtains Bκ.
Hence, under the considered trading protocol, the fact that all intermediaries refer their
buyers induces an outcome that is equivalent to one that could be obtained through a more typical
vertical agreement between the seller and the intermediaries (e.g., royalty contracts or vertical
integration). For instance, under both vertical integration and an appropriately designed royalty
contract, the aggregate profit of the seller and the intermediaries is the integrated industry profit
Π∗. Incidentally, this begs the question of why the referral mode is so widely used, instead of,
say, royalty contracts. One obvious answer is that royalty contracts become very complicated
in the presence of multiple intermediaries, whereas referral schemes work independently of the
number of intermediaries.19
17That is, the action available to intermediary i in the first stage is to choose the set of buyers Bi ⊂ Bi to
refer, and to potentially resale the object in the third stage to Bi \Bi.
18For example, an analogous statement to Theorem 1 obtains, for example, if, in the trading phase there is
no auction but the seller posts a take-it-or-leave-it price. As long as the seller sets the price after observing
the business model chosen by the intermediaries, she will always ask at least an amount equal to the highest
merchant-intermediary’s resale value; this intermediary will, in turn, prefer the referral mode.
19Since intermediaries access different buyers, in order to achieve the integrated industry profit, a vertical
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That the option of referring at a positive fee and different vertical agreements may have
similar effects on market outcomes is of interest to policy makers and competition authorities
who are often concerned that vertical contracts may restrict competition and decrease aggregate
welfare. The following result shows that, pretty much like the classic vertical agreements that
alleviate inefficiencies relating to double marginalization when there is a single intermediary,
referrals are likely to have positive effects on aggregate welfare.
More precisely, consider the case in which intermediaries have no choice but to operate
as merchants. Because intermediaries are symmetric, the seller will set a reserve price equal
to the common resale value of the intermediaries and will end up selling at that price, to one
intermediary at random. The winning intermediary will then run a second price auction with an
optimally chosen reserve price where only the connected buyers will participate. The following
result compares welfare under the equilibrium just outlined, with welfare under the equilibrium
of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. In the game where trading occurs via second price auction with reserve price, in
the unique equilibrium outcome when κ > 0, the sum of the ex-ante expected payoffs of seller,
the ex-ante expected payoffs of the intermediaries and the ex-ante expected payoffs of all buyers
is weakly larger than their joint ex-ante expected payoff for the equilibrium of the game in which
intermediaries have no choice but to operate as merchants.
When all intermediaries adopt the referral mode, the inefficiencies that obtain are the
result of the positive reserve price that the seller sets, which implies that with positive probability
trade will not occur. When all intermediaries are merchants, there are additional inefficiencies
that arise from pure mis-allocation.20 Even when all buyers have a valuation above the reserve
price, inefficiencies occur because the object can end up to intermediary i, but it is intermediary
j 6= i who has access to the highest valuation buyer. Hence, allowing for referrals leads to a more
efficient outcome than in the case where referrals were banned.
4 The emergence of mixed agency-merchant modes
We now relax the ability of the seller to react to the choice of the business model
adopted by the intermediaries. In particular, we consider a game where in the trading phase
and in the resale phase the owner of the object runs a second price auction without a reserve
price. A situation where the highest reserve price that an upstream seller can charge is zero
could naturally arise when there are multiple competing sellers. A key insight of the literature
agreement would require a complex scheme where intermediaries bid for the seller’s good after having sold the
option to buy to buyers, or variants of this.
20Recall that in an optimal second price auction the reserve price is independent of the number of buyers and
it thus the same reserve a merchant intermediary chooses.
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on competing auctioneers (McAfee (1993), Peters (1997)) is that, in large economies, competition
of sellers for buyers has a Bertrand-style flavour and leads to reserve prices equal to a seller’s
value–zero in our case. So viewed this way, this section studies, in a somewhat reduced form, the
case of competing sellers.
The fact that the seller cannot set the reserve of his choice, is capturing reduced bar-
gaining power of the seller vis-a-vis intermediaries. In fact, as we shall see, in this case an
intermediary may expect to obtain a positive profit by adopting the merchant mode. Depending
on the level of referral fees, intermediaries may adopt both the referral mode and the merchant
mode in equilibrium.
We proceed by determining the intermediaries’ payoffs in the trading phase. There are
three cases to consider. In the first case, all intermediaries adopt the referral mode, and their
individual payoff is Bκ.
In the second one, at least two intermediaries adopt the merchant mode. Because
intermediaries are symmetric, the two merchant-intermediaries have the same continuation value
from reselling, and therefore their bid, in the auction run by the seller, will be the same and will be
equal to their resale value. This implies that the expected payoff of the merchant-intermediaries
is zero in such an auction.
The third, and final, case is one where all intermediaries adopt the referral mode,
with the only exception of a single intermediary, who adopts the merchant mode. In this case,
the merchant-intermediary bids her resale value. If we denote by v(X:Y ) the random variable
corresponding to the Xth highest value out of Y draws from the CDF F , we have that the resale
value of a merchant-intermediary is V (B) = E[v2:B ]. At the beginning of the trading phase, the
merchant intermediary competes in the auction with (n−1)B buyers (i.e., those referred by other
intermediaries) and therefore his expected acquisition payoff, A(n,B) is equal to the expected
profit of a participant in a second-price auction with (n − 1)B opponents whose valuations are
drawn from F :
A(n,B) = F (V (B))(n−1)B
[






where the last equality follows from standard results in auction theory. It is easy to verify that
A(n,B) is strictly decreasing with n and tends to 0 as n grows large.
The strategic situation that intermediaries face in the referral phase, thus, reduces to
the following. The payoff of an intermediary who adopts the merchant mode is 0 whenever at
least one other intermediary adopts the merchant mode. It is positive and equal to A(n,B) when
all other intermediaries adopt the referral mode. The payoff of an intermediary who adopts the
referral mode is κB regardless of the choice of the other intermediaries. Table 1 represents this
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Merchant 0, 0 A(2, B), κB
Agent κB,A(2, B) κB, κB
Table 1: First-Stage Referral Game
Theorem 2. Consider the game where trading occurs via a second price auction without reserve
price.
If κB > A(n,B) then there is a unique equilibrium where all intermediaries adopt the referral
mode.
If κB < A(n,B) then (i) there is a set of pure strategy equilibria, in which there is only one
intermediary who adopts the merchant mode and the other intermediaries adopt the referral
mode; (ii) there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium (in addition to the pure ones) where







merchant mode with the remaining probability.
When referral payments are not too high, the equilibrium predicts that intermediaries
may adopt heterogeneous business models. Every pure strategy equilibrium is asymmetric: one
intermediary adopts the merchant mode and all the other intermediaries adopt the referral mode.
There is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium and it is symmetric. In this equilibrium interme-
diaries are indifferent between adopting the referral mode and cashing the referral payment, and
adopting the merchant mode, thus facing some inventory risk, but potentially obtaining a high
profit from reselling.
We now present some comparative statics results, which are a direct corollary of our
previous theorem.
Corollary 3. The following comparative statics obtain for the mixed strategy equilibrium in the
game where trading occurs via a second price auction without reserve price:
• Suppose κB < A(n,B): (i) the probability that an intermediary adopts the referral mode,
denoted α(κ, n,B), is strictly increasing in κ, with α(0, n, B) = 0 and α(A(n,B)/B, n,B) =
1; (ii), α(κ, n,B) is strictly increasing in n.
• There exists a finite and positive threshold n¯(κ) > 0 so that for all n > n¯(κ) there exists a
unique equilibrium in which α(κ, n,B) = 1, i.e., all intermediaries adopt the referral mode.
When the referral fee falls, the referral mode becomes less attractive, and therefore
intermediaries adopt the merchant mode more frequently, i.e., α declines. When referral fees
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become negligible, intermediaries become merchants with probability one. In contrast, when the
number of intermediaries grows, a merchant-intermediary faces more competition, and, ceteris
paribus, her profit declines. As a consequence, intermediaries adopt the referral mode with higher
probability. In fact, even if referral payments are negligible, when the number of intermediaries
is sufficiently large, the equilibrium predicts that all intermediaries adopt the referral mode. This
result resonates with that of Theorem 1. In Theorem 1 the referral mode prevails because the
reserve price allows the seller to extract the resale value of each merchant-intermediary. Here,
it obtains because intermediaries’ competition erodes the profit that merchant-intermediaries
expect by reselling.
We conclude this section by discussing the welfare properties of these equilibria. When
there are nA agent-intermediaries, the bidders in the seller’s auction are nAB referred buyers
and n−nA merchant-intermediaries. The highest bid of the referred buyers is a random variable
v(1:nAB), whereas merchant-intermediaries bid their resale value E[v(2:B)]. To evaluate total
surplus we need to consider two possibilities. With probability Pr{v(1:nAB) > E[v(2:B)]} one of
the referred buyers wins the auction, in which case the total expected surplus is
E[v(1:nAB)|v(1:nAB) > E[v(2:B)]];
with the remaining probability a merchant-intermediary wins the auction, in which case the
surplus the intermediary generates is the expected highest valuation of the buyers accessed by
the winning intermediary, i.e., E[v(1:B)]. Hence, if we let W (nA) be the welfare generated when
nA ≤ n intermediaries adopt the referral mode and the remaining n − nA intermediaries adopt
the merchant mode, we obtain that
W (nA) = Pr{v(1:nAB) > E[v(2:B)]}E[v(1:nAB)|v(1:nAB) > E[v(2:B)]] +
+Pr{v(1:nAB) < E[v(2:B)]}E[v(1:B)]. (1)
It is easy to verify that W (nA) is strictly increasing in nA and that when all inter-
mediaries are agents, nA = n, the outcome is ex-post efficient. In the asymmetric equilibrium
nA = n − 1 and therefore the equilibrium welfare is W (n − 1). Inefficiencies occur because the
object may be allocated to a referred buyer, and, yet, the merchant-intermediary accesses buyers
with higher valuations. In the mixed strategy equilibrium nA is a random variable that follows
a binomial distribution, and so the associated expected surplus is







αnA(1− α)n−nAW (nA), (2)
SinceW (nA) is strictly increasing in nA, and since an increase in α leads to a first order
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stochastic shift in the distribution of the random variable nA, it follows that Wmix(α) is strictly
increasing in α.
Combining these observations with the comparative statics results in Corollary 3 we
obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. The following hold in the game where trading occurs via a second price auction
without reserve price.
1. There exists κ¯ ∈ (0, A(n,B)/B) such that W (n − 1) > Wmix(α(k, n,B)), i.e., the asym-
metric equilibrium generates a higher welfare than the symmetric mixed equilibrium, if and
only if κ < κ¯.
2. There exists a finite and positive n¯ such that for all n > n¯ the mixed equilibrium outcome
is ex-post efficient.
3. As long as κ > 0, regardless of the equilibrium play, the associated welfare is higher than
the welfare generated when referrals are not allowed and therefore all intermediaries are
merchants.
Part 1 shows that when κ is sufficiently low, in the mixed equilibrium the merchant mode
is prevalent and so the welfare is higher in the asymmetric equilibrium. Part 2, an immediate
consequence of Corollary 3, shows that when there is enough competition among intermediaries,
in equilibrium intermediaries adopt the referral mode with probability one and therefore the out-
come is ex-post efficient. The last part of the proposition shows that referrals induce equilibrium
outcomes which are more efficient relative to a situation in which intermediaries are forced to be
merchants.
5 Main Lessons and Robustness
Alternative trading protocols: Our results highlight the importance of the protocol regu-
lating trade between the seller and the intermediaries in determining the business model choosen
by latter. We looked at two somewhat extreme cases. First, we considered the case in which the
seller has full bargaining power against the intermediaries. Second, we considered the case in
which the deck is stacked against the seller and trade takes place by means of an efficient auction.
In the first case, all intermediaries adopt the referral mode; in the second case, both referral and
merchant mode may coexist. As we pointed out, the key determinant of specialization in referral
is that the seller is able to flexibly price out of the market merchant intermediaries. These re-
sults beg the question of what would be the effect of alternative trading protocols. Our analysis
suggests that a specialization in referral will arise as long as the seller has some degree of pricing
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flexibility toward intermediaries and can charge intermediary-specific prices. On the other hand,
a mixed model will arise if the seller has limited bargaining power in the selling stage and, as a
consequence, less pricing flexibility.
Consider, for instance, the case in which the reserve price is set by the seller before
merchants make their business model choice. In this case the seller can induce full referral by
committing to a high reserve price in the sale phase. The seller still retains enough flexibility
and the outcome is one with full referral, even if the reserve price is chosen before the merchants
take their business mode decision. On the other hand, consider the case of a second price auction
where the reserve price is exogenous and somewhere between zero and the optimal reserve price.
In this case the seller has no flexibility and a hybrid market structure, with merchants and agents,
is likely to arise. In fact, the analysis we performed for the case of no reserve price extends to this
case when we take into account that the single-merchant net profit A(n,B) will be now lower as
a result of the higher reserve price.
Vertical Contracts–Non-linear tariffs, Royalties, Profit-Sharing: In many sectors, ver-
tical contracts between upstream and downstream firms can be quite complex. In this paper we
have looked at two cases. In the first case, the seller allows the intermediary complete freedom
in the reselling process he uses–so the intermediary chooses the profit-maximizing one given his
buyers namely a second-price auction with a reserve price. Given that in our set-up this pro-
cedure is the profit-maximizing one, there is no benefit from using non-linear tariffs.21 In the
second case, the intermediary, much like the seller, cannot set a positive reserve price. In this
sense the resale stage is contractible and the contract restricts the choice of the intermediary.
Interestingly, because the upstream seller faces the same restriction, this turns out that it could
be beneficial for the intermediary.
Throughout the paper we assume a simple linear referral fee. The main unraveling force
behind Theorem 1 extends if this fee is accompanied by a commission or a royalty which can
depend arbitrarily on the intermediaries’ profits from resale. The same holds for the trade-offs
that determine the choice between the agent versus merchant mode when the selling protocol is
a second price auction without reserve.
Superiorly Informed Intermediaries As we explore in Appendix B, the main insight of
Theorem 1 remains true if intermediaries have superior information about the number of buyers
they have or their values. Also, if intermediaries have superior information about their buyers’
willingness to pay vis-a-vis the seller, the seller can extract this information after referrals for
21However in a setup where the intermediary would find it optimal to use non-linear tariffs, or where the seller
would impose to the intermediary the use of such a tariff, Theorem 1, goes through as long as the upstream seller
can choose an optimal reserve price in a SPA or, more generally, has price flexibility and can price-discriminate
across intermediaries.
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a negligible commission fee. Observe that in this case a further inefficiency akin to double-
marginalization is present when intermediaries operate as merchants. The seller exercises market
power by restricting supply against intermediaries who, in turn, exercise it against buyers.
Endogenous Referral Fees We have seen that referral fees or commissions are simple and
robust tools that help eliminate inefficiencies. How the resulting higher welfare is split among
parties depends on their relative bargaining powers. It is clear from the statement of Theorem 1
that if the seller has pricing flexibility and full control of the referral fee, he will set it arbitrarily
close to zero. It is less obvious what happens when intermediaries set these fees. We have
analyzed this scenario in Appendix B and have established that, perhaps surprisingly, there is a
continuum of equilibria where referral fees range from one where the seller extracts Π∗, to the
one where intermediaries extract the entire industry profit.
When the seller lacks pricing flexibility, the level of the referral fee determines whether
all intermediaries operate as merchants, agents, or if a mixed mode will prevail. As in the previous
case, it can be shown that if the intermediaries choose the referral fee, there’s an equilibrium
where the referral model is adopted with probability one and intermediaries collectively extract
the entire surplus. In contrast with the previous case, when the seller cannot condition his pricing
strategy on the market structure, there is a minimum referral fee that the seller must set in order
to induce referral by all intermediaries. While we have not been able to prove that the seller
will always want to induce full referral, it can be shown that if the number of buyers that each
intermediary accesses is large enough, the seller will strictly prefer to choose the minimum fee
that guarantees full referral.22
Different Market Segments, Demographics etc. In the context of our model, agency’s
welfare superiority is not limited to environments in which the seller is ultimately connected
to buyers with the same expected demand. Coming to an environment with asymmetric buy-
ers, referrals increase efficiency if there are a number of different consumer types (i.e., different
distributions of valuations) and all the intermediaries are connected to sets of buyers that con-
tain all the different consumer types. Under this scenario, the reserve price that the seller or
intermediaries charge is the same. Therefore in the trading phase, the auction of the seller, in
which all buyers participate, cannot introduce additional distortions compared to those that each
intermediary would introduce in the re-sale phase anyway (Theorem B.3 in Appendix B).
More generally the referral mode is associated with higher welfare for the aforemen-
tioned reasons, whenever intermediaries find it optimal to set a reserve price weakly higher than
the seller. The same is true for environments where the selling protocol to consumers is deter-
22To see this point note that, in view of part 2 of Theorem 2, if the intermediary sets κ = A(n,B)/B, then
each intermediary refers with probability 1. The cost for the seller is κB = A(n,B) per intermediary, and this
goes to zero as B gets large.
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mined by factors beyond the control of the seller and of the intermediary–for example, the retail
price is exogenously fixed due to regulatory requirements or there is intense competition in the
downstream market.
6 Conclusion
The literature on intermediation has primarily focused on identifying channels that make
intermediation valuable and on explaining the presence of intermediaries in modern marketplaces.
As such, the modus operandi of the intermediary was exogenous in the analysis.
Broadly, there are two business models which are widely adopted by intermediaries, the
referral mode and the merchant mode. As we have discussed in length, under the referral mode,
intermediaries receive a fee–a commission–for the introduction of a client to the seller. Under
the merchant mode, intermediaries buy and resell.
In this paper we present a theory that makes the choice of the intermediary’s business
model endogenous. We highlight one of the trade-offs that intermediaries are exposed to in
determining whether to operate as agents or merchants. We consider a number of key variables
but, most importantly, we analyze how the equilibrium industry structure is determined by the
negotiation and trading protocols that characterize the industry.
We see that when the seller can condition her minimum price on whether or not inter-
mediaries are among the buyers, the referral mode prevails and it is the one that is associated
with the highest allocative efficiency. This insight remains true in richer environments. When
the initial seller lacks such price flexibility, both the agency and the merchant mode can co-exist.
We also provide a welfare analysis of the referral mode, which emphasizes the ability of
this business model to solve the allocative inefficiencies that arise with the standard merchant
mode. In our model these inefficiencies result from incomplete information. They relate to the
well-known problem of double marginalization in the merchant mode and to the risk that the
object is not allocated to the highest value client because the wrong intermediary acquires it.
Our analysis points out that first, the referral mode can be welfare enhancing and,
second, higher final prices resulting from the referral mode need not be an expression of market
power, but rather a result of a more efficient allocation of the goods. These observations may
provide useful insights for competition policy in intermediated markets.
We make a number of simplifying assumptions for tractability. As discussed in Section 5,
our results are robust to a number of non-trivial perturbations of the environment. Still, a number
of questions remain open and are left for future work. For instance, our analysis relies on the
good being scarce, perhaps due to a high marginal cost of production. This might not be the right
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assumption in many cases of interest. Also, while in Appendix B we show that full specialization
of all intermediaries in the referral mode arises robustly under many trading protocols where
the seller has pricing flexibility, the absence of flexibility indeed generates different outcomes
depending on the trading protocol. For example, it would be interesting to consider the case of
posted prices in both the upstream and downstream market. Finally, in our model the referral fee
is treated as exogenous and making it the choice of the seller or of the intermediary leads to some
stark results (see Appendix C). However, in general, both the business model and the referral
fee affect both sellers and intermediaries. Therefore, it’s not obvious that these two variables are
exogenous or simply a choice left to one of the two parties.
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A Appendix A: Proofs
Proof Theorem 1. Let r∗, such that r∗ − 1−F (r
∗)
f(r∗) = 0. We first show that in equi-
librium all intermediaries adopt the referral mode with probability one. When an intermediary
chooses to be a merchant he acquires the object from the seller and resells it to his B buyers via
second price auction with the revenue-maximizing reserve price r∗ . Denote by V the expected
profit of the intermediary in this resale auction with B participants who face a reserve price of
r∗. This is how much is worth to the intermediary to obtain the object, that is the intermedi-
ary’s valuation. Notice two things: First, the seller can fully anticipate V . Second, whenever an
intermediary chooses to be a merchant, that intermediary must bid V in the auction that the
seller runs. Then, in equilibrium, the seller’s optimal reserve price depends on whether or not
there exist at least one intemediary that chose to be a merchant: In particular, the seller posts
a reserve of r∗ when all intermediaries are agents, a reserve of rˆ = V when all intermediaries
are merchants and a reserve of rˆ = max{r∗, V } otherwise. For a contradiction, suppose there
is an equilibrium where intermediary i is a merchant with strictly positive probability. When
intermediary i adopts the merchant mode she obtains an expected payoff of 0 because she bids
V and the reserve price is rˆ ≥ V . Hence, intermediary i strictly prefers to adopt the referral
mode, which gives a payoff of κB > 0. It is easy to show that the following strategy profile is
an equilibrium: each intermediary adopts the referral mode, reserve prices are set as described
above, and bidding is truthful.
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall that if an intermediary chooses to be a merchant she
expects to obtain a payoff of A(n,B) whenever all other intermediaries are agents, and a payoff of
0 when at least another intermediary is a merchant, and that A(n,B) ≥ 0. We first characterize
the set of equilibria in which intermediaries play a pure strategy. Suppose two or more intermedi-
aries choose the merchant mode with probability one and the remaining intermediaries adopt the
referral mode. Then, the merchant intermediaries obtain a payoff of 0. Deviating and becoming
an agent pays κB > 0. Suppose all intermediaries adopt the referral mode, so that each gets
κB. If intermediary i deviates and adopts the merchant mode, she will get A(n,B). Hence an
equilibrium where all intermediaries adopt the referral mode exists if and only if κB ≥ A(n,B).
The last possibility is that intermediary i adopts the merchant mode and the other intermediaries
are agents. Note that an agent-intermediary strictly looses if she switches to the merchant mode.
The merchant-intermediary obtains A(n,B) and if she becomes an agent she gets κB, and so she
prefers to be a merchant-intermediary whenever A(n,B) ≥ κB.
We conclude by considering equilibria in which intermediaries mix between adopting
the agency and the merchant mode. It is immediate to see that if a mixed strategy equilibrium
exists, it has to be symmetric. So, suppose each intermediary becomes an agent with probability
α ∈ (0, 1). Then the payoff to an intermediary who becomes an agent is κB, and the payoff to
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an intermediary who becomes a merchant is αn−1A(n,B). In equilibrium κB = αn−1A(n,B),
and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1. To see point 1, recall the definition of Wmix given in (2).
If α(k, n,B) = 0 then Pr(nA = 0) = 1 and Wmix = W (0); while when α(k, n,B) = 1 then
Pr(nA = n) = 1 and Wmix = W (n). Because W (nA) is strictly increasing in nA and Wmix
is continuous in α, the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists α∗ ∈ (0, 1) such
that Wmix > W (n − 1) for α(κ, n,B) > α∗ and the converse holds otherwise. The proof of
this point is concluded by observing that α(k, n,B) is continuous in k and α(0, n, B) = 1 while
α(A(n,B)/B, n,B) = 1. Therefore, again by the intermediate value theorem, the value k¯ must
exist in the interval (0, A(n,B)/B).
Point 2 follows from Corollary 3 and from the fact that when all intermediaries operate
as agents, the outcome is ex-post efficient. To see point 3 note that welfare in the pure merchant
mode is W (0). Then, observe that W (nA) is strictly increasing in nA. It follows that W (n) >
W (n−1) > W (0). Since Pr{nA 6= 0} > 0 when κ > 0, we also conclude that Wmix(α(κ, n,B)) >
W (0) for κ > 0.
B Robustness of Results
In this Appendix we introduce a generalization of the model presented in the Section
2. Intermediaries can be connected to arbitrarily different sets of buyers and to be privately
informed about that set. The seller can choose in the trading phase any selling procedure. More
precisely, the seller of an indivisible object is connected to a set of intermediaries denoted by I
and each intermediary i ∈ I is linked to a set of buyers Bi. Intermediary i privately observes
the set Bi whose members are drawn from a finite set of potential buyers Bi. Let B¯i denote the
expected number i’s buyers. With a slight abuse of notation we denote by I also the number of
intermediaries.
We maintain the assumptions that intermediaries have exclusive access to their buyers,
i.e., Bi ∩Bj = ∅ for all i 6= j; that the assignment of buyers is independent across intermediaries;
that the seller and the intermediaries have zero consumption value, whereas each consumer has
a private consumption value for the object, vi ∈ [vi, v¯i], with vi > 0. Valuations are distributed
independently of one another and of the assignment of buyers to intermediaries according to a
joint distribution. The seller and intermediaries are interested in maximising their profits and
the buyers their surplus. All parties are risk neutral.
Intermediaries have superior information about their buyers’ valuations compared to
the seller. Formally, intermediary i observes a signal si ∈ Si–where Si is finite and stands for
the set of possible signals receivable by intermediary i. This specification encompasses, among
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others, the case where intermediaries have access to the same information and the case where
they only obtain information about their own buyers. A type of intermediary i is ti ≡ (si, Bi),
and Ti is the set of his possible types. Everything that it is not privately observed–including the
structure of intermediaries’ information–is common knowledge.
We look for perfect Bayesian equilibria of the following game:
Referral Phase. Given referral fees {κi}i∈I , each intermediary conditional on his type ti =
(si, Bi) decides which subset of buyers to refer, Bˆi ⊆ Bi. The referral fee κi determines the
payment to i ∈ I per referred buyer.
Trading Phase.
Stage 1 (Sale): The seller observes who is referred and then selects a procedure, formally
a mechanism, to sell the object to intermediaries and referred buyers. Buyers and intermediaries
can opt out and receive their outside option which is zero. The seller commits to the outcome of
the mechanism and by the revelation principle it is without loss to assume that he selects among
direct incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanisms. The game ends either if no
trade takes place or if a buyer obtains the good. If intermediary i ∈ I obtains the object, the
game proceeds to the following stage. Who participates to the mechanism is common knowledge.
We don’t impose any other restriction on what everyone observes in stage 1.
Stage 2 (Resale): If i ∈ I acquires the object, he selects a feasible direct mechanism to
resell the object to the buyers that he has not referred. The game ends at the end of the resale
phase.
The following Theorem B.1 shows that in this more general environment all intermedi-
aries refer all their buyers extending Theorem 1. Theorem B.2 extends the result of Corollary
2 and so confirms the robustness of the insight that referrals leads to outcome which are equiv-
alent to the outcomes obtained by vertical contracting. The discussion on welfare formalised in
Theorem B.3 extends to environments in which referrals are beneficial in terms of welfare.
Theorem B.1 (Unraveling). Suppose that κi > 0 for all i ∈ I. In every equilibrium, all
intermediaries refer all their buyers to the seller regardless of their types.
Proof. We prove the result in two steps: Step 1 proves Lemma 1; Step 2 uses Lemma 1 to conclude
the proof. At the beginning of the trading stage, the seller chooses an incentive-compatible direct
mechanism that satisfies participation constraints (i.e., provides payoff higher than or equal to
zero to all participants). Participants are intermediaries and buyers. Let t denote a generic
profile of types of all the participants in the mechanism. We write ti ≡ vi when agent i is a
buyer. When agent i is an intermediary, ti ≡ (si, Bi) ∈ Ti(Bˆi), where Ti(Bˆi) ⊆ Ti denotes the
support of the seller’s posterior following observed referrals Bˆi. When intermediary i has referred
Bˆi and he has obtained the object, we denote by Vi(t, Bˆi) his expected revenue from resale when
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the profile of types is t–this is intermediary i’s resale value.
Step 1: Zero surplus from resale. Let T ∗i (Bˆi) ≡ {(si, Bi) ∈ Ti(Bˆi) | Bˆi ( Bi} be the set of
intermediary i’s types that, with some probability, have not referred all their buyers and therefore
have strictly positive resale value. Given reports (ti, t−i), let pi (ti, t−i) be the probability that
i gets the good and let xi (ti, t−i) be the expected payment. Then, under truth-telling, the
expected continuation payoff of an intermediary i of type ti = (si, Bi) who has referred Bˆi is:
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Ui (ti) = Et−i
[
pi (ti, t−i) Vi(ti, t−i, Bˆi)− xi (ti, t−i) | ti
]
≥ 0, (3)
where the inequality follows from the fact that we impose voluntary participation constraints.
Lemma 1. Consider an equilibrium history of the game where intermediary i has referred a set
of buyers Bˆi ( Bi. Then, there exists a type ti ∈ T
∗
i (Bˆi) such that Ui (ti) = 0.
Proof. Take a mechanism (p, x) that is feasible and maximizes the seller’s revenue. For a con-
tradiction, assume that Ui (ti) > 0, ∀ti ∈ T ∗i (Bˆi). Let u = minti∈T ∗i (Bˆi)
Ui (ti). We par-
tition the set of types that have referred all their buyers, i.e., Ti(Bˆi) \ T ∗i (Bˆi), in two sets:
Zi ≡
{
ti ∈ Ti(Bˆi) \ T ∗i (Bˆi) | Ui (ti) ≥ u
}
and Hi ≡ Ti(Bˆi) \ {T ∗i (Bˆi) ∪ Zi}.
Consider the following alternative mechanism (p̂, x̂) whereby p̂j = pj and x̂j = xj for









xi(ti, t−i) + u if ti ∈ T ∗i (Bˆi) ∪ Zi
0 otherwise




i|ti) the expected payoff of ti from reporting t
′
i in mechanisms
(p, x) and (p̂, x̂), respectively.
First, we show that (p̂, x̂) is feasible. It satisfies participation constraints trivially.
Incentive compatibility follows because, by assumption, (p, x) is incentive compatible and, by
construction, for all ti ∈ Ti(Bˆi) we have: 1. Ûi(t′i|ti) = Ui(t
′




i (Bˆi) ∪ Zi
and 2. Ûi(t
′
i|ti) = 0 for all t
′
i ∈ Hi.
Second, we show that (p̂, x̂) generates strictly higher expected revenue for the seller
than (p, x). All ti ∈ T ∗i (Bˆi) ∪ Zi pay strictly more under (p̂, x̂) than under (p, x). Since ti ∈ Hi
23Note that ti can be correlated with t−i even if all prior information is independent, because ti = (si, Bi)
may include buyers referred by intermediary i who are among the participants in the mechanism and their types
are in t−i.
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have zero resale value and (p, x) is feasible, then the expected payment from ti’s perspective is










where the equality follows because, by construction, all ti ∈ Hi always pay zero under (p̂, x̂).
Step 2: Unraveling. We conclude the proof by contradiction. Let κi > 0 and suppose that
T ∗i (Bˆi) is non-empty. Lemma 1 implies that there exists ti ∈ T
∗
i (Bˆi) such that Ui (ti) = 0. But
then type ti will strictly prefer to refer buyers Bi \ Bˆi.
Theorem B.1 shows that, in equilibrium, intermediaries refer all their buyers. Since
intermediaries are pooling in their referral strategy, the set of referred buyers does not convey any
information to the seller about their valuations. Therefore, after the referral phase, intermediaries
still possess private information that is valuable to the seller. Can intermediaries profit from this
information?
The answer is no. Once the seller is connected to all buyers, the intermediaries’ informa-
tion becomes payoff-irrelevant, and the seller can acquire it at no cost. For instance, the seller can
offer a very small fraction of his final revenue to intermediaries in exchange for their information,
while committing to use the information to optimize his sale to the buyers. Then, the seller’s
and the intermediaries’ interests are aligned, and intermediaries have an incentive to report their
information truthfully. The use of such commission fees is widespread in industries in which the
price between buyers and seller is negotiable, and intermediaries have relevant information about
buyers’ preferences (e.g., online markets, real estate, recruiting agencies etc.).
This discussion, together with the unraveling result, suggest that, for a commission fee
α and referral fees {κi}i∈I , the seller can always obtain




where recall that the integrated-industry profit, Π∗, is the seller’s ex-ante expected revenue when
he has access to all intermediaries’ information and to their buyers and B¯i denotes the expected
number of intermediary i’s buyers. Hence, given that the seller is free to pick α arbitrarily small,
we obtain the following result:
Theorem B.2. Suppose that κi > 0 for all i ∈ I. In every equilibrium, the ex-ante expected joint
payoff of seller and the intermediaries is the integrated-industry profit Π∗. The ex-ante expected
equilibrium payoff of the seller is Π∗ −
∑
i κiB¯i, while intermediary i obtains κiB¯i.
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Theorem B.2 shows that referrals allow the seller and intermediaries to maximize the
sum of their expected profits, but it is silent with regards to whether or not referrals increase
the efficiency of the assignment of the object to consumers. In our model, neither the seller
nor the intermediaries have positive consumption value, so efficiency is measured in terms of the
valuation of the buyer that acquires the good. We compare the (ex-ante expected) efficiency of
the equilibrium outcome of our game when referrals are and when they are not possible.
Proposition 2. Referrals increase efficiency when there is one intermediary.
Proposition 2 is an immediate implication of Theorems B.1 and B.2, and therefore
we omit the proof. When referrals are not possible, the asymmetric information between the
seller and the intermediary implies that, with some probability, the object does not reach the
intermediary, thereby creating a potential loss in efficiency. This loss is not present with referrals.
Moreover, referrals do not introduce any other inefficiencies: when there is one intermediary, the
seller employs in the sale phase the same mechanism as the intermediary would employ in the
resale phase.
When there are multiple intermediaries a new complication arises: when the seller
aggregates a set of asymmetric buyers coming from different intermediaries, then, at the revenue-
maximising mechanism he will distort the outcome away from the efficient allocation. This
happens because the optimal auction handicaps buyers whose valuations are more likely to be
higher in order to intensify competition and to increase revenue.24 We conclude this section
by describing a set of natural environments where, despite this complication, referrals increase
efficiency.
Definition 1 (Same Asymmetry). Let F(B|s) denote the set of different distributions of valu-
ations of the set of buyers in B conditional on information s. An environment satisfies same
asymmetry if, for all i, j ∈ I, F(Bi|si) = F(Bj |sj) = F(∪l∈IBl| ∪l∈I sl), for all sk ∈ Sk and
Bk ∈ Bk, k = i, j.
In other words, Same Asymmetry means that there are a number of different consumer
types (i.e., different distributions of valuations), but all the intermediaries are connected to sets
of buyers that contain all the different consumer types. Same Asymmetry describes both envi-
ronments with symmetric and asymmetric buyers. If F(B|s) is a singleton and Same Asymmetry
holds, then the environment is one with symmetric buyers. An example is when all buyers are
ex-ante symmetric and the intermediaries’ private information is about the number of buyers
each is connected to. This captures industries in which the main asset of intermediaries is the
large set of potential customers. Another example is when all consumers’ valuations are drawn
24As it is well-known from Myerson (1981), at the revenue-maximising auction the buyer with the highest
virtual valuation–rather than the buyer with highest valuation is awarded the good. The two coincide when all
buyers valuations are identically distributed.
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from the same distribution (i.e., the correct demand function) known to the intermediaries but
not to the seller. This is descriptive of the online travel industry, in which large intermediaries
like Expedia and Bookings.com have more precise information on consumers’ trends than local
hoteliers.
For an example of an asymmetric environment satisfying Same Asymmetry, think, for
instance, social networking websites offering targeted advertising. Each social networking website
is connected to various categories of users: male youths, whose valuation is drawn from some
distribution f ; female youth, whose valuation is drawn from, say, g, and others, whose valuation
is drawn from some other distribution.
Theorem B.3. If Same Asymmetry holds then referrals increase efficiency.
When Same Asymmetry is satisfied, all intermediaries, conditional on their information,
have access to the same set of buyers’ distributions of valuations. Under this scenario, the
optimal mechanism that the seller uses in the trading phase–in which all buyers participate–
cannot introduce distortions in addition to those that each intermediary would introduce in
the resale phase, and, therefore referrals increase efficiency. The reason is that the revenue-
maximizing mechanism is characterized by a set of boundaries which depend only on the set of
different distributions of valuations (that is the set F). These are the distribution-specific reserve
prices and the locus of valuations where the virtual valuations given two different distributions
coincide. Under Same Asymmetry, the same set of reserve prices and virtual valuations exist in
the case when one intermediary is reselling the good to his buyers or the seller sells to all buyers.
Summarizing, the results in this section suggest that referrals are an effective solution
to distortions created by sequential contracting in intermediated markets.
C Endogenous Referral Fee
It is natural to think that the level of the referral fee κi is negotiated between the seller
and the intermediary i. We consider two polar bargaining scenarios, one in which the seller
proposes the referral fees, and another in which each intermediary proposes.
Bargaining power to the seller Suppose that, prior to the referral phase, the seller publicly
proposes a referral fee κi, for all i ∈ I. After the announcement, the game proceeds as described






Since the seller can choose κi arbitrarily small, we conclude that in all equilibria of this game,
he obtains Π∗. When the seller organizes referrals, the intermediary is left with no rent. In this
case, if the intermediary has the ability to commit to not referring his buyers, he will choose to
do so and expect a positive information rent by buying and reselling.
Bargaining power to intermediaries: We now consider the scenario in which intermediaries
propose referral fees to the seller. The timing of the game is as follows. First, intermediaries
simultaneously announce per-buyer referral fees to the seller. Then, the seller decides which
referral fees to accept and which to reject. Intermediaries and buyers may or may not observe
the fees posted by other intermediaries (and their acceptance), but who observes what is common
knowledge and an intermediary observes more than his buyers. If the seller rejects all referral
fees, the game moves directly to the trading phase, as described in Section 2. If at least one
referral fee is accepted, the game moves to the referral phase, and intermediaries whose referral
fee is accepted can refer their buyers. After referrals take place, the game moves to the trading
phase, as described in Section 2.
Let {κi}i∈I be the profile of proposed referral fees. We first observe that, in every
equilibrium where the seller accepts κi > 0, intermediary i refers all his buyers to the seller
(Theorem B.1) and the seller extracts all of his information at no cost (Theorem B.2).25 We now
show that there is a class of efficient equilibria in which all buyers are referred, the joint profit of
seller and intermediaries is the integrated-industry profit, and intermediaries can extract part of
this profit. Every equilibrium in this class is sustained by the seller’s belief that any deviation to
proposing a higher fee comes from the type of intermediary with the highest resale value. These
out-of-equilibrium beliefs are natural, as the intermediaries with the highest resale value are the
ones who have the strongest incentive to deviate by proposing higher fees. For these reasons, this
class of equilibria survives standard equilibrium refinements, such as the intuitive criterion.26
For any subset of intermediaries Iˆ ⊆ I, let Π∗
−Iˆ
denote the payoff that the seller
anticipates, when he expects to be connected to all buyers of intermediaries in I \ {Iˆ} and to
obtain their information, but he is neither connected to nor he has access to the information of
intermediaries’ buyers in Iˆ. In words, Π∗ − Π∗
−Iˆ
is the marginal value to the seller from being
connected to the buyers of intermediaries in Iˆ and having access to all their information.
Theorem C.1.
Seller Proposes. When the seller announces referral fees, there is a unique equilibrium
25Theorems B.1 and B.2 were established for some fee regardless of how the fee is determined.
26When intermediaries propose the referral fees, there also exist equilibria in which intermediaries do not always
refer. For example, consider an equilibrium in which intermediary i, regardless of his type, demands a referral fee






, and the seller, whenever he observes a referral
fee different from κ∗
i
, believes that the intermediary has the highest possible resale value. In this equilibrium, the




outcome where intermediaries refer all their buyers and earn zero profits, and the ex-ante expected
equilibrium payoff of the seller is the integrated-industry profit Π∗.
Intermediaries Propose. When intermediaries propose referral fees, for any profile






κ∗iE[|Bi|], for all Iˆ ⊆ I, (4)
there is an equilibrium in which each type of intermediary i ∈ I proposes κ∗i , the seller accepts the
proposal and the intermediaries refer all their buyers. In this equilibrium, the ex-ante expected




iE[|Bi|], and the ex-ante expected equilibrium payoff
of intermediary i is κ∗iE[|Bi|].
Proof. Seller Proposes. Since Theorems B.1 and B.2 apply when κi > 0 for all i ∈ I, we know
that the seller can always guarantee himself a payoff arbitrarily close to Π∗ by setting κi > 0 for
all i ∈ I arbitrarily small. Therefore, there is no equilibrium where the seller obtains a payoff
strictly less than Π∗. To complete the proof, we need to show that there is an equilibrium in
which the seller sets κi = 0 for all i ∈ I and all intermediaries refer all buyers. This follows from
arguments identical to the ones used to establish Theorem B.2 and are, therefore, omitted.
Intermediaries Propose. For any κ∗i , i ∈ I that satisfies the conditions in the statement of
the second part of Theorem C.1, consider the following strategy profile: For each i ∈ I, each
intermediary type ti ∈ Ti proposes κ∗i . The seller accepts κi ≤ κ
∗
i , and rejects κi > κ
∗
i , for all
i ∈ I. When the seller observes a proposal κi ≤ κ∗i , his beliefs about intermediary i’s type remains
equal to his prior. When the seller observes κi > κ
∗
i , he believes that intermediary i is of the
highest resale value type. When the seller accepts a referral fee κi ≥ 0, the intermediary i refers
all his buyers. In the trading phase, the seller sets a feasible revenue-maximizing mechanism. We
show that this profile of strategies is an equilibrium.
If the intermediary ti ∈ Ti proposes κ∗i , he obtains |Bi|κ
∗
i . By proposing κi < κ
∗
i , he
obtains |Bi|κi < |Bi|κ∗i . If he proposes κi > κ
∗
i , the seller rejects the proposal and believes that
the intermediary has the highest resale value. Hence, the intermediary obtains a payoff of zero
regardless of whether or not he gets the object at the trading phase.
Next, consider the seller. It is clear that it is optimal to reject κi > κ
∗
i given that her
posterior belief in that case is that the intermediary is of the highest resale value type. The
condition in equation ( 4) guarantees that the seller is not willing to deviate by rejecting any set
of proposals of referral fees at {κ∗i }i∈I .
The findings of Theorem C.1 may help rationalize the observed heterogeneity in referral
fees within and across industries. For example, in the online travel agency industry the typical
27
commissions vary from 0% for airline tickets and car rentals to 20-25% for hotel rooms and
vacation packages.27
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